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"'...in social evolution nothing is
inevitable but thinking makes it so."
Friedrich A. Hayele, J 944
"tn recent years macro-economists have
made great strides in learning more
about the limits to our ability to make
predictions about and to control
national economies."
Thomas D. Willet, J 992
The problem of the role of the state in eco-
nomic life, better than any other social problem,
confirms Hayek's idea that in the evolution of
society nothing is inevitable - inevitability is the
product of thinking it. This is one of those sub-
jects the social sciences deal with that give per-
ception the slip by their very capriciousness: as
soon as it seems that logical, consistent and em-
pirically convincing answers have been found, in
new social circumstances they prove incomplete
or even persuasively erroneous. For this reason
the economics profession in the last twenty years
has been in the phase of sobering up from the
idea that depersonalized, well-nigh natural laws
have been discovered that allow for the possibil-
ity of the successful supervision and control of
national economies.
The exponentially growing complexity of
20th century social systems has contributed to the
diffusion of this perception. Questions and prob-
lems multiplied much faster than answers, the
disproportion between problems and the under-
standing of how to solve them culminating at the
end of the 80s. Then the problem of transition, as
it is called, showed how many practical questions
there are to which economists have no answers in
which they can have at least some confidence.
Because of the nature of the topic, this pa-
per does not have any rigorously scientific ambi-
tions. It would be best to describe it as an essay or
an unfinished train of thoughts which I have
endeavoured to imbue with a little logical firm-
ness and theoretical and empirical grounding.
The degree of logical consistency and empirical
conviction attained is much lower than that re-
quired by a serious scientific paper, and conse-
quently I harbour no illusions that my ideological
beliefs have not had some influence on it. To this
extent the views put forward are very largely sub-
ject to criticism, further work and major alter-
ations.
Finally, the subject of thiswork iskept delibe-
rately narrow. I am not dealing with the problem
of defining growth and development, preferring
to assume that growth and development are in pro-
portion to the growth in measurable added value.
I am not dealing, then, with the problem of immea-
surable social costs and gains (negative and posi-
tive externals) that arise in the production of real
added value, although this part of the economic
process is very important with respect to defining
the role of the state. However, addressing this
problem would require a great deal more space.
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In the first part of the paper the problem is
viewed from a historical perspective so that it
might be possible to define it with some preci-
sion. The aim is to distinguish two different views
of intervention: short and medium term interven-
tion, the aim of which is to bring into equilibrium
an economic system that has unexpectedly be-
come unbalanced under the influence of some
temporary macro-economic shock; and general
forms of state intervention that determine long
term growth and development. In the second
part of the work indications of some answers at a
general level are offered. In the third part of the
work, the answers are made concrete through
examples of countries in transition, as they are
sometimes called.
THE DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM
IN A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Can growth and development in the West
in this century be explained by growth in state
consumption, or the strengthening, that is, of the
role of the state and intervention in the economy?
It would seem that the answer is "no": Germany
and Japan have achieved high average rates of
growth with a below average percentage of state
consumption in added value. Great Britain, with
a below average percentage, has achieved a rate
of growth that is convincingly the slowest among
the developed countries, while Sweden, with the
highest share, had achieved the highest growth
after Japan by the end of the seventies. It is also
clear that the relative slow-down of growth in
Great Britain started round about 1870-1880, at
a time when the share of public expenditure in
GDP was still relatively small (Brittan, 1979, ac-
cording to Olson, 1982). And Sweden, as well as
having the greatest state share in added value,
went through a period of very rapid growth until
the end of the 70s and a period of very slowgrowth
from the beginning of the 80s until the present
day. It seems that the experiences of individual
countries are so specific and that their socio-eco-
nomic systems are so different that any kind of
country average (statistically and logically) would
be insufficiently reliable to be able to have any
kind of firm theory built upon it.
It is enough to look at statistical data. What-
ever big enough group of countries we might take,
we would soon see that it is difficult to set up any
kind of determinist link between economic growth
and the share taken by the state in the economy.
If the ratio of public indebtedness to GNP should
be chosen as a yardstick of deficits accumulated
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in the past, and if we assume that this gauge cor-
relates with the role of the state in the economy,
we shall see that countries with sound develop-
mental successes have almost incredibly different
ratios. At the beginning of the nineties Spain had
a 35% share; Austria over 50%, Holland about
60% (this last figure being the Maastricht crite-
rion), while Greece was close on 90%, and Italy,
Ireland and Belgium exceeded 100% (Barro and
Grilli, 1994 according to Alesina and Perotti,
1994). Alesina and Perotti analyzed the possible
causes of these levels and the differences in the
ratios of national debt and GNP, and found two
very important ones: political conflicts of interest
groups or political parties from the same coali-
tion government, and differences in the institu-
tions and procedures involved in making up the
budget. All these, of course, are political causes.
There is no trace of a connection with develop-
ment or growth.
And yet, most economists today believe that
economic growth cannot be achieved without the
state having a large role. This belief is not troubled
by the fact that in the real-life political process, in
which the ideas of economists are turned into the
concrete measures and instruments of economic
policy, the argument for state intervention under-
goes systematic changes and is sometimes trans-
formed into protectionist or populist pamphlets.
Nor is this belief disturbed by older historical ex-
perience, for example the fact that Great Britain,
during the course of the previous century (more
precisely, from 1812 to 1896)was the fastest grow-
ing national economy with a very small role being
played by the state, with a deflation of about 50%.
When an averagely trained economist in
Croatia today thinks of deflation, he will recall
the link between deflation and recession, with the
small role being played by the state, in developed
countries at the beginning of the 1930s. Because
of a superficial interpretation of events and the
neglect of economic history at the universities, the
collective professional memory of Croatian
economists about the coexistence of deflation and
growth without there being any very great role
for the state during many previous periods has
been completely erased. What are the reasons for
this, and are they at all connected with the belief
that there is a narrow positive link between state
intervention and economic growth?
I believe that two causes might explain the
amnesia of the average economist when it is a
question of historical facts going back further than
70 or so years. The first cause is political. At the
turn ofthe 19th and 20th centuries, in the period
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that Schumpeter called the defeat of laissez-faire,
there were very deep political changes in the West.
Ever wider social classes became involved in the
political process, the franchise was given to more
and more people, and the political initiative was
taken by the conservative and the socialist par-
ties. Only those liberal parties that were prepared
to change their political programmes and re-
nounce their originally liberal ideologies of the
19th century remained on the political scene
(Schumpeter, 1954). The constantly more pro-
nounced political ambitions of various classes and
groups were carried over into political life: the
unions grew stronger, cartels and monopolies got
stronger on the supply side. For this reason prices
got less and less responsive to the relations of sup-
ply and demand in the marketplace and some of
them could be altered more readily via the use of
political power. From today's perspective it seems
that it is just this fact that has marked the 20th
century, and that the influence of these political
events on economists arose because of the belief
that only the relations between the variables in
the kind of political framework that is similar to
that existing today can help in the solution of cur-
rent economic problems.
The second cause of the collective amnesia
of some economists derives from the fact that
Keynesianism, or Keynesian politics and ideology,
vulgarly interpreted as a recommendation that the
budgetary deficit be increased so as to encourage
growth, has always found more supporters than
different ideas that came from the other side of
the ocean. Messages that grew out of British ideas
and the state of the British economy in the thir-
ties have been transferred to us.
The ideas, and particularly the different
interpretations of the ideas of John Maynard
Keynes, cut economists off from economic his-
tory before the 20s of this century and implanted
a belief in the economic profession that the col-
lective mind with sufficiently powerful macro-eco-
nomic instruments at its disposal was capable of
palliating cyclical recessions through reactions. In
this it was too often forgotten that Keynes him-
self very clearly distinguished between the scope
of macro-economic policies in the short and the
long term. Keynes pointed to the possibility that
the expansion of aggregate demand/consumption
stimulated by the action of the state (monetary
expansion and/or a budgetary deficit) might ease
a recession that occurred as a result of price ri-
gidity, that is, because of the inability of prices to
be adequately downward adjustable in the short
term, in conditions of exogenous contractions of
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aggregate demand. Keynes was but little con-
cerned with the longer term. Thus the central
message of Keynes's General Theory was really
accepted as being general however much it arose
in and was good for the specific circumstances of
a small number of developed countries.
Keynes did not bother much with an analy-
sis of the causes of price rigidity. For him rigidity
was a fact of life, for the world in which he grew
up and worked (Great Britain in the first part of
the 20th century) was marked by a growth in the
cartelization of the supply of goods (and a
cartelization of the demand for labour), as also
by the growth in the unionization of the supply of
labour. Later empirical research showed the jus-
tifiability of Keynes's point of departure for a
group of developed countries. Philip Cagan (1974)
for example showed that prices in the USA have
been less and less adjustable downwards during
the cyclically repeated recessions of this century.
Keynes, and the Keynesians, believed that
the "market error" had been discovered, the cause
of involuntary unemployment, and the cure for
it. But this conclusion meets with problems at sev-
eral different levels of perception. Here we shall
mention two:
1. Is price rigidity really a market error or
is it a matter of a political error, that is the influ-
ence of political on economic processes?
2. Did the results achieved by Keynesian
policy in the 30s unambiguously prove the cred-
ibility of the Keynesian message?
In Table 1 the main macro-economic indi-
cators for Great Britain are displayed, for the
homeland of Lord Keynes, that is, where the in-
fluence of his ideas and policy was the greatest.
Table 1: Great Britain between two world wars.
Year Unemployment GNP' Base index of Base price
rote indo oroduction index
1913 2.1% 4.8 61 36
1918 0.8% 4.3 50 85
1923 11.3% 4.4** 60 60
1928 11.2% 4.9 73 53
1933 21.3% 4.7 73 39
1934 17.7% / 80 40
1935 16.4% / 87 40
1936 14.3% / 94 43
1937 11.3% / 100 50
1938 13.3% 5.8 97 46
• constant prices; •• datum for 1924
Source: Cipolla, Corio M.(ed) 1976, The Fontana Economic History of
Europe, Contemporary Economies, 2 -statistical supplement
The period between 1918 and 1923 was
marked by deflation and a constant rise in the un-
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employment rate with a very small rise in real
GNP and a somewhat more sensible rise in in-
dustrial production. In the period from 1923 to
1928 there was still both deflation and growth,
but the unemployment rate was by now very high.
In the period from 1928 to 1933, the time of the
Great Depression, unemployment peaked, and
real output stagnated, although deflation came
cumulatively to as much as 26.4%. After this there
were obvious policy changes. From 1933 to 1938
the country entered a phase of mild inflation, a
somewhat faster growth and a fall in the unem-
ployment rate. However, the unemployment did
stay very high and was at the lowest in 1937with
11.3.%. That is, the name as in 1923.Accordingly,
the policies implemented in the 30s only palliated
the problems, and did not go very far towards solv-
ing them. Very high unemployment obviously ex-
isted immediately after the first and immediately
before the second world war. The policy of the
exogenous expansion of domestic demand proved
to be a stop-gap measure that did in some mea-
sure succeed in softening the recessionary effect
of the contraction of the international market that
went on during the interval between the two wars.
The scope of the anti-cyclical Keynesian policy is
limited to the short and medium term, and in the
long run we are all dead, as Keynes wrote; how-
ever, the question that Keynes to some extent
neglected in his recommendations does need an-
swering: what determines growth and develop-
ment in the long run and, especially, how does a
state have to behave in order to encourage or at
least not hamper long term growth and develop-
ment?
According to Olson (1982) it was impossible
that there should be better results from Keynesian
policies because the policy of manipulating ag-
gregate demand was based on a superficial diag-
nosis of the problem. Price rigidity, which was
considered a market error, was in fact a political
error that arose as a result of the unionization of
the labour market and the cartelization of the
market for goods. Various formal and informal
interest groups accumulated enough power to be
able to effect the suspension of the functioning
of the market and the subordination of price
trends in their own partial interests. This kind of
political sclerosis of the price structure led in the
long term to the deceleration of the process of
reallocating resources. From Olson's argument it
follows that, with a correct diagnosis of the prob-
lem, much better effects would be given by a mi-
cro-economic policy directed to the increase of
price structure sensitivity and the acceleration of
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the reallocation process than by a macro-eco-
nomic policy that simply came to terms with the
existing micro-economic structure.
The social function of the market and prices
can be seen in the coordination of the kind and
intensity of various economic activities in accord
with the wishes and material capacities of people.
When prices are formed freely and in some mar-
kets high rates of profit are achieved, entrepre-
neurs are motivated to enter these markets and
increase supply. A greater supply depresses the
price (increases real output and standard of liv-
ing) but the new entrepreneur continues to make
a profit. It is true that this is somewhat less than
the profit of the entrepreneur who has already
been doing business in this market, but it is still
big enough to bring in new entrepreneurs until
profit becomes equal to zero (which still contains
the normal profit, the usual entrepreneurial re-
muneration) or, that is, until prices come into
balance, supply and demand being equal. And as
long as markets are not in equilibrium, here is a
motivation for the movement of resources to pro-
duce for various markets. However, at the same
time, there is also the motivation of those who
have been operating in this market to stop the
movement of resources to keep supply at the ex-
isting (too low, from the point of view of social
benefit) level, at which they can make very high
profits.
Accordingly, even on markets that at first
sight seem competitive markets, producers can
block the transfer of resources by political means
and thus indirectly control prices. The final re-
sult is similar to a monopoly, with the difference
that market disequilibrium is maintained with in-
struments of political power, while in the case of
the monopoly it is a matter of economic equilib-
num.
Keynesians, accordingly, failed to notice
that the essence of economic problems lay in the
arthritic state of the British institutional system
of the 30s, in which various interest groups had
been consolidated, with enough power to hold up
the process of free competition, which was made
considerably easier by the reduced scope of in-
ternational trade and the reduction of pressure
from import competition. And instead of recom-
mending a policy based on the slogan that a good
micro-economic policy that encouraged the real-
location of resources was the best macro-eco-
nomic policy (Olson, 1982), in the search for the
best macro-economic policy, Keynes achieved
only partial results. We should say at the end that
such results, imperfect as they are, are also very
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important. But it is necessary to move on.
INDICATIONS FOR A SOLUTION
The achievement of partial solutions is not
an unusual outcome if one bears in mind that the
expansion of total domestic demand does not
necessarily have to be connected with the main
economic problem - tardiness in the realloca-
tion of resources. In this light it is useful to con-
sider the experience of two countries inwhich dif-
ferent macro-economic policies were carried out,
in which the state played an important role in the
macro-economic processes, but whose micro-eco-
nomic policies were directed towards stimulating
the speed of the reallocation of resources. These
are Switzerland and Sweden.
Switzerland is a country that in the period
between the wars shared the recessionary fate of
other European countries. After the second world
war, Switzerland recorded a high rate of growth,
and during the whole of the century the Swiss
unemployment rate has never exceeded 6.5%
(Siegenthaler, 1976): "It is true that the disinte-
gration of international economic links after 1929
had a restrictive effect on the trends of overall
demand in Switzerland, as in other countries, so
that some capacities remained unused, and the
growing quantities of resources for increasing
productivity were out of use. However, at that time
the foundations for future growth were laid down.
The traditions that favoured growth were
strengthened, and all kinds of tradition that im-
peded growth vanished." (Siegenthaler, 1976:
534). According to this author, among the pre-
requisites for growth the following stand out:
1. cooperativeness among unions and employers
and loyalty to peaceful settlements of industrial
conflicts and
2. employers' associations refraining from lobby-
ist pressures to protect individual products or to
carry out any other measures that would slow
down the reallocation of resources, all between
1945 and 1975.
Mancur Olson (1982) identified the same
causes in Sweden, a country with one of the high-
est and most stable growth rates between 1870
and 1980. He stresses a firm national union orga-
nization that in the post-war era had two great
advantages over American or British union orga-
nization:
1. Unions were centralized, so that the
union leaders managed to resist the narrow in-
terests of locals and protect the interests of the
working class as a whole, which was not necessar-




2. Unions organized in this way often re-
fused a static policy of subsidizing wages above
the value of the marginal product of labour in
companies without a future, and instead advo-
cated the subsidizing of the costs of the spatial
and technical reallocation of labour (subsidizing
moving costs and/or retraining 'etc').
And as far as the system of "protecting the
domestic product" is concerned, the following
table says more than any kind of verbal explana-
tions. The figures show that Sweden and Switzer-
land in the 70swere the most open national econo-
mies:
Table 2: Average weighted rates of











Source: Olson (1982): 134
The trustworthiness of these data can of
course be suspected, but if we have in mind the
previously quoted explanation of Siegenthaler
about the development of Switzerland and Olson's
reference to Sweden, it would seem that there is
some point in the data. An additional confirma-
tion is offered by the example of New Zealand
which, from the top of the development list of the
OEeD countries in the 1950s had by the end of
the 70s fallen to the very bottom with, as we can
see, an exceptionally high level of protection. The
renewed economic boom in the country from the
mid 80s started with the carrying out of a whole
series of economic reforms directed towards de-
monopolization, privatization and the opening up
of the country's economic system.
Accordingly, it isworth repeating again and
again what should have been clear enough after a
study of the basis of micro-economics: only com-
petition ensures adequate socio-economic dynam-
ics that can in turn ensure a stable, high and long-
term economic prosperity for a nation. The open-
ing up of the domestic market and the removal of
barriers to mobility of resources are measures of
economic policy whose efficacy does not bear any
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comparison with the macro-economic manipula-
tions of the Keynesian type, which only in certain
conditions is capable of alleviating problems in
the short term, but will not heal the deeper prob-
lems of economic ill-health. The share of the state
in added value thus comes in as a second order
indicator: in an open country in which resources
shift quickly from sector to sector, a high state
involvement can appear in conjunction with a high
growth rate insofar as the structure of state out-
lays is such as not to hinder and perhaps even
stimulate reallocation; in a closed economy with
institutions that slow down the allocation of re-
sources, even a very low input ofthe state in GDP
is not an adequate condition for stable and rapid
growth.
If this recipe is so simple, why is it not fol-
lowed in all countries?
The answer was given by Mancur Olson
developing the theory of collective action (1982)
which he tested by the explanation of the rises
and falls of relative economic power of individual
nations. The theory starts off from the natural
tendency of people to combine in order to de-
fend their short term interests (it seems that only
in political life does Keynes's dictum that we are
all dead in the long run hold true). Further, some
(formal or informal) group organization can in-
crease the prosperity of its members so that:
a. it can appropriate a greater amount of
newly created social value for its members or
b. it can contribute to an increase of the total
newly created value of society so that its mem-
bers can profit from a higher absolute value of an
unchanged share.
Investing resources in another type of ac-
tivity is clearly the only effective solution from
the standpoint of society as a whole. However,
the problem of social coordination arises because
an increase in total newly created value requires
coordination with other interest groups, which can
have prohibitively high costs. If we imagine that
some group includes social actors that create 1%
of added value, every increase of the overall added
value will bring the group an advantage of 1% of
the increase. Because of this, the group will sup-
port an increase in overall added value only if the
costs of this support:
a) are less than the 1% increase of added
value (a necessary condition)
b) if the net benefit (1% increase minus the
costs of support) is greater than the net benefit
resultant upon group action for an increased cut
in the existing added value (an enabling condi-
tion).
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If the formal and informal groups are al-
ready strongly organized and if there is a large
number of them so that their coordination is ex-
pensive, groups will act as "distributive coalitions"
whose aim is to increase the share of the group
in existing added value. On the other hand, if such
groups are not yet consolidated so that they can-
not block the process of the reallocation of re-
sources, the mechanism of economic competition
will ensure the maximum attainable total added
value. Also, if the partial interests of the group
have been inserted in the wider organizational
framework at the national level (for example, the
corporative model of collective bargaining of the
German or Austrian type) then the likelihood of
the reallocation process being blocked is smaller.
Olson's theory consists of nine hypotheses,
of which only the most important are mentioned
here.
1. Organizations for the attainment of par-
tial interests and partial cooperation reduce effi-
cacy and aggregate income, and make the politi-
callife of the nation more difficult.
2. Great organizations like national unions
that include a greater number of creators of
added value have a greater chance of recognizing
overall interests than small, partial interest groups.
3. The number and power of small distribu-
tive coalitions are cumulative in time.
4. Distributive coalitions reduce the capac-
ity of society to accept new technologies and the
reallocation of resources and so reduce the po-
tentially achievable rate of economic growth (a
formal, mathematical proof of this hypothesis was
given by Sir John Hicks in Mueller, 1979, accord-
ing to Olson, 1982).
5.An accumulation of distributive coalitions
in some society increases the complexity of regu-
lation, the role of the state and reduces the abil-
ity to understand and change the directions of
social evolution.
Olson showed the correctness of these hy-
potheses through the examples of a number of
countries. It is a pity that he wrote his book be-
fore it came clear that in the 80s that Sweden's
economic rate had begun a relative slow-down. It
would have been an interesting example.'
AFTER SOCIALISM
The economic causes of the collapse of so-
cialist systems are: closedness, slowing down (or
erroneous) reallocation of resources, and the ac-
cumulation of power on the part of partial inter-
est groups. From 1990 until the present day
JULY - DECEMBER 1996
throughout Central and Eastern Europe there has
been a laboratory social experiment attempting
to create national economic systems to overcome
the severe sicknesses of old and outmoded devel-
opmental models.
After five years we are witnesses to the
enormous differences in approach to this social
experiment. Unfortunately the time period is too
short, and macro-economic measures are too un-
reliable, for us to be able to judge with any cer-
tainty about the successes of the various countries.
However, there are already indications that those
countries that the earliest and most deeply started
to carry out liberalization measures directed to-
wards the building of a market system, among
which is Croatia, are entering the phase of eco-
nomic recovery.
But there is one particularly important fact:
the process never takes place spontaneously, eco-
nomic recovery never takes place anywhere where
there is simply a regulative vacuum. A great role
for the state in this process is important and in-
dispensable, and instead of the state being under-
stood as a necessary evil, the state, or better to
say, its instruments, should be understood as an
opportunity for the shaping of the principles of
the life of a community based on individual free-
doms limited only by equal freedoms for others.
Of course, the instruments of state power in them-
selves do bear elements of coercion and because
of this the state can help to ensure that market
competition takes place according to civilized
rules, that economic defeats and victories are worn
with grace, that the reallocation of resources is
speeded up, but it can also be instrumentalized
and turned into a sword in the hands of a minor-
ity, that is, of formal and informal groups with
exclusive (formal or informal) right of recourse
to the instruments of coercion, after which eco-
nomic backwardness and an institutional crisis in
the community will ensue. The state, then, is a
potential that can be used for good or evil.
In this, what is crucial is the perception of
the role of the state that is dominant in the ruling
party or coalition or among the creators of eco-
nomic policy. If changes in the micro-economic
.structure are pushed into the background because
of lobby influences, and the imperative to pro-
vide short term growth is pushed into the fore-
ground, then it is clear that this kind of country is
going to try to manipulate aggregate demand. This
will be manifested in a budgetary deficit, mon-
etary policy will have an accommodating charac-
ter, and the exchange rate will probably be run
with successive devaluations. And in such condi-
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tions too it is possible to attain growth, but this
willbe "bad" growth for it is taking place in a static
micro-economic structure that does not have an
internal motives for change, because of the poor
structure of rights of ownership and relative prices
that in great measure differ from prices in other
countries. In short, this is a growth that cannot be
guaranteed to be sustainable over the long term.
On the other hand, in countries in which
micro-economic reforms are foregrounded, we
can expect a smaller budgetary deficit and even a
balanced and autonomous monetary policywhich
is not dependent on fiscal policy but on exchange
rate policy. The exchange rate can be fluctuating
or fixed, but if it is fixed we will not expect fre-
quent devaluations.
If we look at the five most successful coun-
tries in transition (according to de Melo et al.,
these are Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary,
Slovenia and Croatia) then Poland and Hungary
belong to the first group, and the Czech Repub-
lic, Slovenia and Croatia to the second group of
countries.
The shape and "behaviour" of a country are
obviously related to the political process, and poli-
tics is in close connection with the culture of the
people who live in this country. (Unless it is a
matter of a state form deriving from a different
culture imposed by force, as happened to the na-
tions of Central and Eastern Europe after the first
and/or second world wars.) For this reason the
kind of state intervention in the economic pro-
cesses will depend on the (lack of) existence of
informal norms, habits and the formal micro-eco-
nomic institutions deriving from them that help
in the reallocation of resources. Where such hab-
its and institutions do exist, a state form will prob-
ably arise that does not have very large interven-
tionist or protectionist ambitions, but which will
build up its institutions or regulatory system with
the aim of further development of the market
economy of free prices and mobile factors. Where
such habits and institutions do not exist, there will
be on the one hand a regulatory vacuum which
will favour the (further) growth of a crime
economy, and on the other hand a state with pow-
erfully expressed protectionist and intervention-
ist ambitions, which will attempt to make up for
the shortage of micro-economic stimuli for the
allocation of resources. It should be emphasized
that these are only abstract and extreme cases;
real-life economic systems will only tend towards
one or other of these extremes.
For this reason it is difficult to approach
the problem of the role of the state in the transi-
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tion phase in some standardized way and to opt
for some general solutions. The fact is that the
opening of the economy and the encouraging of
price freedom and production factor mobility does
have the ring of a general recommendation, but
it is also a fact that this is not a sufficient condi-
tion for growth. Diverse norms, habits and insti-
tutions in different countries can favour or work
against the efficiency of such a policy, and the
social sciences have, for the present, unfortu-
nately, little to say about the causes of non-eco-
nomic differences, about the mechanisms by
which they can be changed or made to converge.
Thus the final result will depend on the culture
and history of the nation, on the political rela-
tionships, on the many factors that lie beyond the
cognitive range of economic analysis. Therefore
economic analysis at this moment cannot, at the
level of principle, recommend more than slightly
threadbare phrases about the need to open up, to
have a stable country and to carry through micro-
economic policies directed to a speeding up of
the processes of resource reallocation. And there-
fore on the basis of economic analysis itself we
cannot foresee the results of the so-called transi-
tion process, and in several years at least on the
basis of economic analysis itself we shall be in
the state to understand what has actually hap-
pened to us.
When we are speaking of Croatia, we be-
lieve that we have a culture that as well as accept-
ing will actually provide for the growth of an
economy of free prices and, in general, market
freedoms. The role ofthe state, accordingly, I see
in the sophisticated regulation and assistance of
this system, and in no way in any rigid industrial
policies that in the long run can put the entrepre-
neurial instincts of thousands of people to sleep.
For me, in this phase of the development of a
young state, the fact that 100,000 companies have
been set up (one for every 48 citizens) is much
more important than data about the trends in the
industrial production index. The first number is
mainly a measure of the future, while the second
is a measure of the past. The quality of economic
policy should be evaluated according to the ex-
tent to which it makes possible the accomplish-
ment of the economic potential that is for the
moment concealed in these small organizations.
If we evaluate the current economic poli-
cies of the Republic of Croatia from this point of
view, the following conclusions have to be drawn:
1. The overall macro-economic framework
(fiscal, monetary policy and exchange rate policy)
that came into being after the beginning of the
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implementation of the stabilization programme
is ideally adapted for the accomplishment of long
term and stable growth, which has already shown
some first results (the growth for 1994 and 1995).
2. The price system is satisfactorily liberal-
ized so that all the preconditions have been cre-
ated for domestic relative prices to mirror the
relative scarcity of goods and to move in narrow
correlation with world prices.
3. However, in the system that protects the
domestic market there is still a great degree of
arbitrariness and subordination to interest pres-
sures, which can be seen in the great dispersion
of protective instruments and the great disper-
sion of degrees of protection for various groups
of products.
4. Privatization is too slow and is going on
according to the hyper-normalized model thought
up back in 1990/91, when it was slave to the illu-
sion of so called "estimated" values of companies.
However, the rapid privatization of property in
which the state funds had an intermediary func-
tion would not have been a problem per se if it
had gone side by side with the de-monopoliza-
tion and privatization of the public companies,
which however did not occur.
5. Linked to (4) above, all the chances for
reducing the national debt via swaps of shares for
old foreign currency savings were not used, be-
cause the so called "fire sale" was not allowed on
that market. For that reason we have a national
debt and a lower level of privatization, and if a
"fire sale" had occurred we would have had a
smaller national debt and a larger degree of
privatization of property.
6. The legal protection of creditors is inad-
equate, which creates large internal debts and
reduces the possibility of controlling the money
supply. Protection of creditors is not carried out
because of a few large and medium sized compa-
nies (public companies and companies largely
owned by the state) which, by non-payment of
debts, subsidize labour costs above its (very low)
marginal productivity. Thus a quasi-fiscal deficit
in the wider sense of the word is generated and in
fact in this way there is the uncontrolled financ-
ing of a static social policy which directly freezes
the reallocation of labour.
7. Linked (6) above, there is an absence of
a dynamic social, or rather development policy
that would set up sophisticated mechanisms to
encourage the reallocation of resources. Since the
problems of resources frozen in production that
has no future is area-specific (for reallocation is
much faster in Zagreb than in Osijek, Sisak or
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Trogir), it is clear that there is room for a spatial
development policy (great fiscal relief for all kinds
of employment of the workers in steel-works, ship-
yards and so on in other economic activities, but
only after the establishment of an efficient con-
trol mechanism).
8. Inadequate pressure to rehabilitate the
banks, which will have to end up with the
privatization of bad banks.
At the end it should be said that although
in this work there has been no mention of the re-
construction and defence that are the main ques-
tions of the day and the chief forms of state inter-
vention, everything that has been previously stated
is directly connected with these problems. The
success of awiselydesigned economic policywhich
will contribute to the openness and rapid reallo-
cation of resources will directly contribute to de-
fence capabilities and the opportunities for recon-
struction. This attitude is not based on sheer reli-
gious faith, but on experience from the 1993-1995
period, in which macro-economic stability was the
key factor leading to the recovery of economic
activities and the state budget (the Oliveira-Tanzi
effect, according to Anusic, Rohatinski and Sonje
(ed.), 1995). This has directly contributed to the
increase of the degree of the organization and
equippedness of the Croatian Army in a critical
period of our history, and to increased abilities to
invest in the reconstruction of the country.
CONCLUSION
There are two different kinds of state in-
tervention. Firstly there are short term and me-
dium term macro-economic (anti-cyclical) poli-
cies the aim of which is to palliate the cyclical re-
cessions. However, these are not the policies that
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determine growth and development in the long
run. In the long run, the growth and development
are determined by the openness of the country
and the speed of the reallocation of resources,
which depends on the intensity of the competi-
tion. And competition, openness and speed of
reallocation of resources depend on the resistance
of the instruments of state power to pressures of
smaller interest coalitions whose power of influ-
ence, if it does exist, mainly brings about a redis-
tribution of existing added value and does not
contribute to the growth of the overall real added
value. However, the framework of the state is
nevertheless necessary for the development of a
market economy: wherever there is no regulatory
framework a criminal economy will develop, as
will a stagnant institutional and economic struc-
ture. Therefore the state has to provide a legal
framework for the enforceability of contracts and
for respect for rules of the game that are clear
and known in advance. Insofar, the state is a col-
lective instrument of power that can be used well
or badly.
The post-communist recession is not a cy-
clical phenomenon and its causes cannot be re-
moved only by anti-cyclical macro-economic in-
struments. This is rather a deep institutional cri-
sis from which the only exit is through the carry-
ing out of micro-economic policies directed to-
wards the opening of the country and the accel-
erated reallocation of resources. •
1 In the 80s, the Swedish economy rose at the low average
rate of 2%. In 1991, the social-democrats lost the elections
when it became clear that the Swedish model of market so-
cialism had lost its internal stimuli for growth.
